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On June 29th, 1972, the Supreme Court handed down its
first decisions directed to the procedural rights of untenured faculty. The results were mixed and not uncom,
plicated. (The full Opinions are printed at 406 U.S.
92 S. Ct. 2694, 40 U.S.L.W. 5079.) In Board of Regents
v. Roth, by a vote of five to three (Brennan, Douglas, and
Marshall dissenting, the three Nixon appoirtees joining
White and Stewart in the majority, Powell taking no part),
the Court appeared to hold essentially that untenured
faculty members have no constitutional right to any procedural observances in the nonrenewal of their appointments. In Perry v. Sindermann, however, the Court
agreed unanimously that the technical absence of formal
tenure was not conclusive of the faculty member's procedural rights and that proof of de facto tenure would entitle him to some degree of explanation and opportunity
for reconsideration. In between, the Court appears to
have left room for a concept of quasi-tenure applicable to
significant numbers of regular faculty members, a terra
incognita that may well raise serious practical questions
for general institutional policy in cases of nonrenewal or
nonreappointment. The larger implications of both cases
may appropriately be pursued in the detailed analyses of
the professional law journals. This Comment will confine
itself to a brief review of the decisions plus a closing
observation about their relevance to the AAUP's Statement on Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments.
The Reductionism of Roth: The Untenured Faculty
Member as a Limited Appointee Entitled to No
Further Consideration

The constitutional issue of pretermination procedural
rights was raised most starkly in Roth, a case involving
an assistant professor of political science at Wisconsin
State University-Oshkosh, who received unexplained
notice in January of his first year of teaching advising him
that he would not be reappointed for the next academic
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, Professor of Law at Duke
University, is Chairmanof the Association's Committee A on
Academic Freedom and Tenure.
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year. The notice came shortly after Professor Roth had
made a number of public statements critical of the University administrators and board of regents, and Professor
Roth was one of only 4 (of 442) untenured faculty members at the University whose appointments were not renewed that year. In his complaint in the federal district
court, Professor Roth alleged that the University's summary action of unexplained notice without opportunity
for hearing or reconsideration violated the Fourteenth
Amendment provision that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.
The district court sustained Professor Roth's position
to the extent of holding that due process required the
University administration to respond to a request for an
explanation of its decision to discontinue him and to grant
him some opportunity to be heard on reconsideration of
the matter, albeit with the burden being his to show that
the stated reasons were either "wholly inappropriate as
a basis for decision or that they [were] wholly without
basis in fact." Only then, the district court added, "would
the university administration become obliged to show that
the stated reasons are not inappropriate or that they have
a basis in fact." (310 F. Supp. 972, 980 [W.D. Wis.
1970]). The University appealed from this decision, but
the court of appeals affirmed and the case thereafter went
to the Supreme Court where it was consolidated with
Perry v. Sindermann for argument.
The Supreme Court majority found it unnecessary to
determine whether the district court had erred in its
specification of the particular procedural rights it had
determined to be required by due process. Rather, the
majority held that the clause did not apply at all:
[Respondent has not shown that he was deprivedof liberty
or property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed.
Analytically, the majority treated Professor Roth's situation exactly on the same footing as that which would be
appropriate in respect to a special or limited appointment
for a single year, the kind of situation where even notice
of nonreappointment would itself be anomalous because
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it could only be regarded by the special appointee himself
as a gratuitous discourtesy. By placing Professor Roth in
this different frame, as though he were not a regular
appointee and as though there were no significant distinctions between his situation and that of a special one-year
terminal appointment, the majority of the Supreme Court
reduced his constitutionally cognizable substantive interests in reappointment to zero. It followed smoothly that
the due process clause had not been triggered and thus,
in a constitutional sense, no process of law was due Professor Roth at all.
The position of the majority was unaffected by the fact
that nonrenewal of untenured faculty members at Oshkosh
was apparently highly exceptional at the time, a point the
district court had emphasized both in terms of its evidentiary force regarding the real implications of regular
appointment at the institution and its relevance in measuring the real burden to the University to provide some
opportunity for reconsideration in the occasional case of
nonrenewal. That this matter was felt by the Supreme
Court majority to be of too little significance, rather than
that it might somehow have been overlooked, seems clear
from the fact that a footnote in the majority Opinion
obliquely refers to it. That the decision is indeed a significant one which will not be easy to distinguish or to limit
is further attested by the fact that the majority was also
aware of the coincidence that notice of nonrenewal followed shortly after Professor Roth's critical public utterances. (The district court had stressed the coincidence as
lending additional weight to some right to explanation and
pretermination review as an important means of protecting the faculty member's substantive First Amendment
freedom of speech.) Finally, the majority was not inclined
to view the case as distinguishable from one of a limited
one-year special appointment in spite of the possible far
greater difficulty Professor Roth might expect to encounter in finding a position somewhere else after unexplained termination from Oshkosh following his very
first year as a regular faculty member, a point also stressed
by the district and circuit courts in holding in his favor.
The different view of the Supreme Court majority appears
in the trailing portion of still another footnote:
Mere proof . . . that his record of nonretention in one job,
taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to
some other employers would hardly establish the kind of
foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of
"liberty" [sufficient to entitle him to some measure of preterminationprocedural due process].
Given the analytic basis of the decision, Roth necessarily deals a heavy blow to further claims by untenured
faculty members to procedural rights in the consideration
of reappointment, at least as a matter of constitutional
right. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in this case
not only reversed the judgment of the seventh circuit, but
simultaneously rejected decisions from the fifth and first
circuits (with federal appellate jurisdiction in the South
and New England respectively) which had previously
held that some measure of pretermination procedural due
process was constitutionally required in circumstances like
those in Roth.
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Nevertheless, the different result in Perry v. Sindermann
(decided the same day) complicates the picture a good
deal and provides room for a number of important second thoughts.
The Realism of Sindermann: De Facto Tenure and
the Importance of Collateral Effects

Neither his letter of appointment nor any state statute
provided Professor Robert Sindermann with tenure as a
regular faculty member at Odessa Junior College when,
in May, 1969, the Texas Board of Regents voted not to
renew the latest in the series of one-year appointments he
had held at the College. A lead sentence in the College's
official Faculty Guide itself declared, moreover, that
"Odessa College has no tenure system." Professor Sindermann's situation at Odessa might therefore appear to have
been indistinguishable from that of Professor Roth at
Oshkosh. Accordingly, the same outcome might have
been expected in the Supreme Court after the Texas
Regents had secured review of the decision of the fifth
circuit that had held in favor of Professor Sindermann's
claim for some measure of pretermination procedural due
process. (The two cases were also similar in the coincidence that Professor Sindermann's unexplained notice
of nonrenewal followed shortly on the heels of news
reports of his public and political activities.)
Unlike David Roth, however, Professor Sindermann
was in his tenth year of full-time faculty service, the last
four of which he had served at Odessa (including service
for a time as cochairman of the department of government and social science). Notwithstanding the formal
disclaimer of any tenure system, moreover, official publications of the College and of the Coordinating Board of
the Texas College and University System clearly implied
the existence of a de facto tenure policy at Odessa, a
policy arguably covering Professor Sindermann since it
adhered to AAUP standards in providing for credit for
three years service at other institutions. Noting that Professor Sindermann alleged that he met the terms of that
policy and had relied upon it, the Supreme Court first
distinguished Roth in holding that here more than "a
mere subjective 'expectancy' " of reappointment was involved. Accordingly, it held that proof by Sindermann
that tenure protection was implied in fact in his case
would be sufficient demonstration of an existing "property interest" in reappointment to trigger the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus to require some degree of intramural procedural due process before he could be deprived
of that interest.
Up to this point, the Sindermann Opinion is encouraging: dry legalism is not utterly dispositive of professional
security and the technical absence of formally conferred
de jure tenure is not always controlling of one's right to
intramural procedural due process in case of nonreappointment. Even where the state may not have adopted
a formal tenure system and a faculty member's letter of
appointment may itself refer only to a specific term, the
existence of an official policy or authoritative practice
akin to tenure may imply some degree of intramural procedural due process as a matter of constitutional right.
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Nevertheless, in what may be hoped to have been casual
dicta added at the close of Mr. Justice Stewart's Opinion
for the majority, the description of the kind of procedural
due process constitutionally assured a faculty member
under these circumstances is breathtakingly slight:
Proof of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate
college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he
could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and
challenge their sufficiency.
Thus, the Court appears to declare that even one with de
facto tenure may not be entitled as a matter of constitutional right to any pretermination procedural due process.
Rather, much like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in
Wonderland, the administration may declare "sentence
first, trial and verdict later." Moreover, the burden
would apparently be placed upon the faculty member
seeking reinstatement to overcome a presumption of
regularity accompanying the statement of grounds for
termination presented by the administration in that hearing. While it is very doubtful that the Court meant in any
way also to imply that such a post hoc procedure with its
reversal of the burden of proof is constitutionally sufficient where tenure has been conferred de jure, it nonetheless managed by this statement to take away much of the
little good it had just done in identifying conditions of
de facto tenure, by thus immediately eroding its strength
in terms of its constitutionally required procedural entitlements.
A similar qualification characterized still another portion of the Opinions that otherwise acknowledged a
limited constitutional right to procedural due process
under special circumstances of nonrenewal. In Roth, the
Court was careful to distinguish what it deemed to be the
ordinary and foreseeable hardship of an unexplained
nonrenewal at the end of an initial one-year academic
appointment from other kinds of collateral consequences
which would be sufficient to require procedural due
process insofar as the university might itself be directly
responsible for those collateral consequences. Specifically,
Mr. Justice Stewart laid considerable stress on the fact
that in declining to rehire Professor Roth "[t]he State . . .
did not make any charge against him that might seriously
damage his standing and association in his community":
Had it done so, this would be a different case. For
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing
to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."
Mr. Justice Stewart also stressed that the decision of nonrenewal in Roth did not itself authoritatively foreclose
Professor Roth from any other employment opportunities,
i.e., it did not operate as a matter of law to bar him from
consideration elsewhere even assuming that other institutions might regard the fact of his nonreappointment at
Oshkosh as a matter of some practical significance. He
was quick to add, moreover, that the collateral effect of
a larger legal consequence accompanying nonrenewal
would describe a different case and might well require
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the observance of procedural due process.
Even so, the character of intramural procedural due
process which the presence of either of these collateral
effects beyond per se nonrenewal may make available to
the distressed faculty member is evidently limited to the
possibility of securing relief only from the effects themselves. Success in refuting the institution's discrediting
public statements in the course of a university hearing
would still not entitle the faculty member to reinstatement.
Again, the point is discoverable in a footnote:
In such a case, due process would accord an opportunityto
refute the charge before University officials.12
12 The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person
an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name
at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him
future employment for other reasons.

The logic of this position is perfectly straightforward,
namely, that water cannot rise higher than its source:
since a post hoc hearing is constitutionally required only
because of collateral injury to reputation resulting from
damaging public statements by the institution and not at
all because of nonrenewal per se, the relief it provides is
solely for the benefit of reputation and not in contemplation of reinstatement. Although the Court did not expressly say so (and quoted dicta from other cases implying the contrary), moreover, the logic of its position may
likewise imply that the only required purpose of providing
a hearing where the decision of nonrenewal would authoritatively foreclose other employment would be to provide
an opportunity to rescind that particular collateral effect
without, however, securing reinstatement within the institution itself.
Even so, the result suggested above is very much open
to doubt and subject to reasonable dispute. If a public
institution failed to renew a faculty member's appointment solely because it originally believed certain things to
be true which a fair hearing subsequently established to
be false (even assuming that the opportunity to have
proved them false would not have been provided except
that it was constitutionally required because the institution
made a public statement about the matter), continued
refusal to renew the appointment might then be successfully challenged on the basis that it can only be explained
as an arbitrary reaction, i.e., as an arbitrary refusal to
treat the faculty member on equal terms with others whose
appointments were renewed, discriminating against him
solely on the basis of an earlier belief of unfitness since
refuted in a fair hearing. As the hearing itself was a
matter of constitutional right, moreover, the institution
could not hope to defend itself on the basis that the
faculty member's decision to press for a hearing was itself
sufficient evidence of lack of trust or temperamental incompatibility to decline to reinstate him.
The Terra Incognita of Quasi-Tenure and the Better
Position of AAUP Policy

With all of this uncertainty stemming from the
Opinions in Roth and Sindermann, there is yet another
complexity that warrants examination. Between the tenyear instance of termination under an alleged policy of
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de facto tenure (as in Sindermann) and the first-year
instance of nonreappointment under circumstances where
the Court found that neither an explanation nor an opportunity for reconsideration is constitutionally required (as
in Roth), there is a great deal of terra incognita where
the majority of untenured faculty members and official
institutional policies are actually to be found.
In Roth, Mr. Justice Stewart (writing for the majority)
may well have been troubled by the lack of sufficient substance to David Roth's claim of any officially encouraged
expectation of reappointment to fit it by analogy to a
qualified or contingent "property" right, suitably to distinguish it from the claim of a disappointed first-time
applicant or special appointee. The record in the Roth
case, judged by Mr. Justice Stewart's characterization of
it, left some things to be desired to the extent that it may
not have indicated that there were official statements of
criteria for reappointment and progress toward tenure
consideration- statements which might have helped David
Roth to provide a line of constitutional distinction in
either of the two respects the majority of the Court evidently believed to be important. Designation of his
appointment as a regular member of the faculty coupled
with official assurances objectively encouraging him to
anticipate reappointment upon satisfactory service as defined in reasonably attainable standards might have generated more substance to the view that he possessed a
contingent property interest of which he could not be
deprived without some measure of intramural due process.
Similarly, official provision of standards contemplating
reappointment in the absence of professional shortcoming
or immoral conduct might have rendered an otherwise
unexplained nonrenewal decision so great a slur upon the
appointee's professional or personal standing as to be
viewed as a deprivation of "liberty" (of reputation or
contract) triggering the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. It may not parse phrases too closely
to aggregate all of Mr. Justice Stewart's qualifying observations about the record in the Roth case, for instance,
in suggesting that the decision may yet permit meaningful distinctions to be made in the future:
[O]n the record before us, all that clearly appears is that
the respondent was not rehired for one year at one University. . . . [The terms of his appointment] did not provide
for contract renewal absent "sufficientcause." Indeed, they
made no provision for renewal whatsoever. . . . Nor, significantly, was there any state statute or University rule or
policy that secured his interest in re-employment or that
created any legitimate claim to it. ... In the present case
. . . there is no suggestion whatever that the respondent's
interest in his "good name, reputation, honor or integrity"
is at stake. . . . The District Court made an assumption
"that non-retentionby one universityor college creates concrete and practical difficulties for a professor in his subsequent academic career. . . . But even assuming arguendo
that such a "substantial adverse effect" under these circumstances would constitute a state imposed restriction on
liberty, the record contains no support for these assumptions.
Given the overall conservative cast of the balance of
the Opinion, it may read too much into these qualifying
observations to suggest that they mark out obvious possi-
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bilities sharply to limit and to distinguish the basic holding. Nevertheless, they may imply that on a better record,
under more compelling circumstances where the faculty
member is well along the tenure track under policies explicitly encouraging reliance and practices consistent with
that reliance, peremptory notice of nonreappointment may
not be enough to quench the constitutional claim to more
specific consideration than none at all.
Accordingly, the set of Opinions in Roth and Sindermann together with their full implications may now confront institutions of higher learning with a sharper choice :
to avoid the "hazard" of even minimum constitutional
procedures by strategically withdrawing any official encouragement of professional security for the faculty and
retreating behind the ironplate of seried, short-term
terminal contracts, thus to reserve a prerogative of procedural arbitrariness; or to systematize instead a policy
of positive incentives with a willingness to provide some
explanation and opportunity for reconsideration when so
requested. It may be significant in this regard that in closing his Opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart went out of his way
to note that the Court's decision was confined to a construction of the Constitution itself and that not all that the
Constitution tolerates is necessarily "appropriate or wise
in public colleges and universities." And again there is a
footnote, by no means disapproving, comparing as an
example the AAUP's Statement on Procedural Standards
in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments.
A Postscript on the Substantive Constitutional
Freedoms of the Faculty

Nothing in either Roth or Sindermann at all impairs
the statutory right of a faculty member to secure full redress in an appropriate federal court upon proof of his
allegation that his nonreappointment was significantly
influenced by considerations foreclosed by the Bill of
Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. In both Roth and
Sindermann, the Supreme Court remanded the cases to the
federal district courts to consider the merits of each faculty member's first amendment claim that the decision of
nonreappointment was in retaliation for critical public
utterances which the faculty member alleged to be protected by the First Amendment. With no dissent to this
proposition, Mr. Justice Stewart observed:
The first question presented is whether the respondent's
lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment,
taken alone, defeats his claim that the nonrenewal of his
contract violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
We hold that it does not.
In this respect, the decision fully confirmed prior holdings
of Supreme Court cases that lack of tenure has no effect
upon the substantive equal protection of First Amendment rights, and it wholly lays to rest inconsistent dicta
which had appeared in certain lower court decisions (e.g.,
Jones v. Hopper, 110 F.2d 1323 [10th Cir. 1970]). The
problem does remain as a result of Roth, however, that
the practical risk of retaliatory nonreappointment is
doubtless enhanced insofar as no explanation or intramural hearing of any kind need be provided.
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APPENDIX
[The following is reprinted from The United States Law Week, Vol. 40, pp. 5079-5091, June 27, 1972.]
the decision and no opportunity to challenge it at any sort of
hearing.
The respondentthen brought this action in a federal district
court alleging that the decision not to rehire him for the next
year infringed his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He attacked
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1968 the respondent,David Roth, was hired for his first the decision both in substance and procedure. First, he alleged
that the true reason for the decision was to punish him for certeaching job as assistant professor of political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was hired for a fixed tain statements critical of the University administration,and
term of one academic year. The notice of his faculty appoint- that it therefore violated his right to freedom of speech.5
ment specifiedthat his employment would begin on September Second, he alleged that the failure of University officials to
1, 1968, and would end on June 30, 1969.1 The respondent give him notice of any reason for nonretention and an opporfor a hearing violated his right to proceduraldue process
completed that term. But he was informed that he would not tunity
of law.
be rehiredfor the next academic year.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the
The respondent had no tenure rights to continued employment. Under Wisconsinstatutorylaw a state universityteacher respondent on the procedural issue, ordering the University
can acquiretenure as a "permanent"employee only after four officials to provide him with reasons and a hearing. 310 F.
972. The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting,
years of year-to-yearemployment. Having acquired tenure, a Supp.
teacher is entitled to continued employment "duringefficiency affirmedthis partial summary judgment. 446 F. 2d 806. We
and good behavior." A relatively new teacher without tenure, granted certiorari.404 U. S. 909. The only question presented
however, is under Wisconsin law entitled to nothing beyond to us at this stage in the case is whether the respondenthad a
his one-year appointment.2 There are no statutory or admin- constitutionalright to a statement of reasons and a hearing on
istrativestandardsdefining eligibility for re-employment.State the University's decision not to rehire him for another year.4
law thus clearly leaves the decision whether to rehire a non- We hold that he did not.
tenuredteacher for another year to the unfettereddiscretion of
I
University officials.
The procedural protection afforded a Wisconsin State UniThe requirementsof procedural due process apply only to
versity teacher before he is separated from the University the
deprivationof interestsencompassedwithin the Fourteenth
As
matter
of
to
his
a
a
law,
job security.
statutory
corresponds
Amendment's
protection of liberty and property. When protenured teacher cannot be "dischargedexcept for cause upon
written charges" and pursuant to certain procedures.3 A non- tected interests are implicated the right to some kind of prior
tenured teacher, similarly, is protected to some extent during hearing is paramount.7 But the range of interestsprotected by
his one-yearterm. Rules promulgatedby the Board of Regents proceduraldue process is not infinite.
The District Court decided that proceduraldue process guarprovide that a nontenuredteacher "dismissed"before the end antees
apply in this case by assessing and balancingthe weights
of the year may have some opportunityfor review of the "dismissal." But the Rules provide no real protection for a non- of the particular interests involved. It concluded that the
tenured teacher who simply is not re-employed for the next
year. He must be informed by February first "concerning for non-retention need be given. No review or appeal is provided in such
retention or non-retention for the ensuing year." But "no case.
"RULE III- 'Dismissal' as opposed to 'Non-Retention' means terminareason for non-retentionneed be given. No review or appeal tion
of responsibilities during an academic year. When a non-tenured
*
is provided in such case."
faculty member is dismissed he has no right under Wisconsin Statutes to
a
review
his case or to appeal. The President may, however, in his
In conformancewith these Rules, the Presidentof Wisconsin discretion,ofgrant
a request for a review within the institution, either by a
State University-Oshkosh informed the respondent before faculty committee or by the President, or both. Any such review would
be
in
and would be advisory only.
informal
nature
he
not
be
1969would
rehired for the
February 1, 1969, that
"RULE IV- When a non-tenured faculty member is dismissed he may
1970 academic year. He gave the respondent no reason for request a review by or hearing before the Board of Regents. Each such

The Board of Regents of State Colleges et al., Petitioners,
v.
David F. Roth, Etc.

1 The respondent had no contract of employment. Rather, his formal
notice of appointment was the equivalent of an employment contract.
The notice of his appointment provided that: "David F. Roth is hereby
appointed to the faculty of the Wisconsin State University Position number 0262. (Location:) Oshkosh as (Rank:) Assistant Professor of (Department:) Political Science this (Date:) first day of (Month:) September (Year:) 1968.*' The notice went on to specify that the respondent's
"appointment basis" was for the "academic year. And it provided that
"[regulations governing tenure are in accord with Chapter 37.31, Wisconsin Statutes. The employment of any staff member for an academic
year shall not be for a term beyond June 30th of the fiscal year in which
the appointment is made." See n. 2, infra.
2 Wisconsin Statutes 1967, c. 37.31 (1), in force at the time, provided
in pertinent part that:
"All teachers in any state university shall initially be employed on
probation. The employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and
good behavior, after 4 years of continuous service in the state university
system as a teacher."
3 Wisconsin Statutes 1967, c. 37.31, in force at the time, provided in
pertinent part that:
"No teacher who has become permanently employed as herein provided shall be discharged except for cause upon written charges. Within
30 days of receiving the written charges, such teacher may appeal the
discharge by a written notice to the president of the board of regents of
state colleges. The board shall cause the charges to be investigated, hear
the case and provide such teacher with a written statement as to their
decision."
* The Rules, promulgated by the Board of Regents in 1967, provide:
"RULE I- February 1st is established throughout the State University
system as the deadline for written notification of non-tenured faculty concerning retention or non-retention for the ensuing year. The President of
each University shall give such notice each year on or before this date."
"RULE II- During the time a faculty member is on probation, no reason
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request will be considered separately and the Board will, in its discretion,
or
same in each individual case."
grant
5 Whiledeny
the respondent alleged that he was- not rehired because of his
exercise of free speech, the petitioners insisted that the non-retention
decision was based on other, constitutionally valid grounds. The District
Court came to no conclusion whatever regarding the true reason for the
University President's decision. "In the present case," it stated, "it
appears that a determination as to the actual bases of [the] decision must
await amplification of the facts at trial. . . . Summary judgment is inappropriate." 310 F. Supp., at 982.
6 The courts that have had to decide whether a nontenured public employee has a right to a statement of reasons or a hearing upon nonrenewal of his contract have come to varying conclusions. Some have
held that neither procedural safeguard is required. E. g., Orr v. Trinter,
444 F. 2d 128 (CA6); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F. 2d 1323 (CA10); Freeman
v. Gould Special School District, 405 F. 2d 1153 (CA8). At least one
court has held that there is a right to a statement of reasons but not a
hearing. Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F. 2d 1182 (CA1).
And another has held that both requirements depend on whether the
employee has an "expectency" of continued employment. Ferguson v.
Thomas, 430 F. 2d 852, 856 (CA5).
7 Before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded opportunity for some kind of a hearing, "except for extraordinary
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies
postponing the hearing until after the event." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U. S. 371, 379. "While '[m]any controversies have raged about ... the
Due Process Clause,' ...
it is fundamental that except in emergency
situations [and this is not one] due process requires that when a State
seeks to terminate [a protected] interest . . . , it must afford 'notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the
termination becomes effective." Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542. For
the rare and extraordinary situations in which we have held that deprivation of a protected interest need not be preceded by opportunity for
some kind of hearing, see, e. g., Central Union Trust Co. v. Garyan 254
U. S. 554, 566; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 597; Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594.
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"Whilethis Court has not attemptedto define with exactness
the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment]
the term has received much consideration, and some of the
included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraintbut also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry,establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the
orderly pursuitof happinessby free men." Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U. S. 390, 399. In a Constitution for a free people, there
can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty"must be broad
indeed. See, e. g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499-500;
Stanley v. Illinois, - U. S. - .
There might be cases in which a State refused to re-employ

a person under such circumstances that interests in liberty
would be implicated. But this is not such a case.
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not
make any charge against him that might seriously damage his
standing and associations in his community. It did not base
the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that
he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done
so, this would be a different case. For "[w]here a person's
good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because
of what the governmentis doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U. S. 433, 437. Wiemanv. Updegraff,344 U. S. 183, 191;
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S.
123; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 316-317; Peters
v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 352 (concurring opinion). See
Cafeteria Workersv. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 898. In such a
case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the
charge before University officials.12 In the present case, however, there is no suggestion whatever that the respondent's
interest in his "good name, reputation,honor or integrity"is at
stake.
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining
to re-employ the respondent,imposed on him a stigma or other
disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of
other employment opportunities. The State, for example, did
not invoke any regulationsto bar the respondentfrom all other
public employment in State universities. Had it done so, this,
again, would be a different case. For "[t]o be deprived not
only of present government employment but of future opportunity for it is no small injury. . . ." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 185 (Jackson, J., concurring). See Truaxv. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41. The Court has
held, for example, that a State, in regulating eligibility for a
type of professional employment, cannot foreclose a range of
opportunities"in a manner . . . that contravene[s] due process," Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 238,
and, specifically, in a manner that denies the right to a full
prior hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character,373 U. S.
96, 103. See Cafeteria Workersv. McEhoy, supra, at 898. In
the present case, however, this principle does not come into
play.13
To be sure, the respondenthas alleged that the nonrenewal
of his contract was based on his exercise of his right to freedom of speech. But this allegation is not now before us. The
District Court stayed proceedings on this issue, and the
respondent has yet to prove that the decision not to rehire
him was, in fact, based on his free speech activities.14
Hence, on the record before us, all that clearly appears is
that the respondent was not rehired for one year at one
University. It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a
person is deprived of "liberty"when he simply is not rehired
in one job but remains as free as before to seek another.
Cafeteria Workersv. McElroy, supra, at 895-896.

8 "The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary,
depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature
of the subsequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371,
378. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263; Hannah v. Larche,
363 U. S. 420. The constitutional requirement of opportunity for some
form of hearing before deprivation of a protected interest, of course, does
not depend upon such a narrow balancing process. See n. 7, supra.
9 In a leading case decided many years ago, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that public employment in general
was a "privilege," not a "right," and that procedural due process guarantees therefore were inapplicable. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46,
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U. S. 918. The basis of this
holding has been thoroughly undermined in the ensuing years. For, as
Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court only last year, "this Court
now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether
a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' "
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374. See, e. g., Morrissey v.
Brewer, - U. S. - , - : Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539; Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 n. 6;
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568; Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U. S. 398, 404.
10 See, e. g., Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 208; Bell v.
Burson, 402 U. S. 535; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254.
11 "Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' [in the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause] with any great precision, that term is
not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint." Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U. S. 497, 499. See, e. g., Stanley v. Illinois, - U. S. - .

12 The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an
opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a
hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future
employment for other reasons.
13 The District Court made an assumption "that non-retention by one
university or college creates concrete and practical difficulties for a professor in his subsequent academic career." 310 F. Supp., at 979. And the
Court of Appeals based its affirmance of the summary judgment largely
on the premise that "the substantial adverse effect non-retention is likely
to have upon career interests of an individual professor" amounts to a
limitation on future employment opportunities sufficient to invoke procedural due process guarantees. 446 F. 2d, at 809. But even assuming
arguendo that such a "substantial adverse effect" under these circumstances would constitute a state imposed restriction on liberty, the record
contains no support for these assumptions. There is no suggestion of how
nonretention might affect the respondent's future employment prospects.
Mere proof, for example, that his record of nonretention in one job, taken
alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to some other employers
would hardy establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting
to a deprivation of "liberty." Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
supra.
14 See n. 5, infra. The Court of Appeals, nonetheless, argued that opportunity for a hearing and a statement of reasons were required here
"as a prophylactic against non-retention decisions improperly motivated
by exercise of protected rights." 446 F. 2d, at 810 (emphasis supplied).
While the Court of Appeals recognized the lack of a finding that the
respondent's nonretention was based on exercise of the right of free
speech, it felt that the respondent's interest in liberty was sufficiently
implicated here because the decision not to rehire him was made "with

respondent'sinterest in re-employmentat the Wisconsin State
University-Oshkosh outweighed the University's interest in
denying him re-employment summarily. 310 F. Supp., at
977-979. Undeniably, the respondent's re-employment prospects were of major concern to him- concern that we surely
cannot say was insignificant. And a weighing process has long
been a part of any determination of the form of hearing required in particularsituations by proceduraldue process.8 But,
to determine whether due process requirementsapply in the
first place, we must look not to the "weight"but to the nature
of the interest at stake. See Morrissey v. Brewer, - U. S. - ,
- . We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth
Amendment'sprotection of liberty and property.
"Liberty"and "property"are broad and majesticterms. They
are among the "[g]reat [constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning from experience. . . . [T]hey
relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and
the statesmenwho founded this Nation knew too well that only
a stagnant society remains unchanged." National Ins. Co. v.
TidewaterCo., 337 U. S. 582, 646 (Frankfurter,J., dissenting).
For that reason the Court has fully and finally rejected the
wooden distinction between "rights"and "privileges"that once
seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process
rights.9 The Court has also made clear that the property interests protectedby proceduraldue process extend well beyond
actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.10 By the
same token, the Court has requireddue process protection for
deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints
imposed by the criminal process.11
Yet, while the Court has eschewed rigid or formalistic
limitations on the protection of proceduraldue process, it has
at the same time observed certain boundaries. For the words
"liberty" and "property"in the Due Process Clause of the
FourteenthAmendmentmust be given some meaning.
II
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Ill
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of
propertyis a safeguardof the security of intereststhat a person
has already acquired in specific benefits. These interestspropertyinterests- may take many forms.
Thus the Court has held that a person receiving welfare
benefits under statutory and administrativestandards defining
eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those
benefitsthat is safeguardedby proceduraldue process. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254.16 See Fleming v. Nestor, 363
U. S. 603, 611. Similarly, in the area of public employment,
the Court has held that a public college professor dismissed
from an office held under tenure provisions, Slochower v.
Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551, and college professors and
staff members dismissed during the terms of their contracts,
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, have interests in continued employmentthat are safeguardedby due process. Only
last year, the Court held that this principle "proscribingsummary dismissal from public employment without a hearing or
inquiry required by due process*'also applied to a teacher
recently hired without tenure or a formal contract, but nonetheless with a clearly implied promise of continued employment. Connell v. Higgenbotham,403 U. S. 207, 208.
Certain attributes of "property"interests protected by procedural due process emerge from these decisions. To have a
propertyinterest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the
ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarilyundermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional
right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to
vindicate those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandingsthat stem from an
independentsource such as state law- rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus the welfare recipients in Goldberg
v. Kelly, supra, had a claim of entitlementto welfare payments
that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them.
The recipientshad not yet shown that they were, in fact, within
the statutory terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a
right to a hearingat which they might attempt to do so.
a background of controversy and unwelcome expressions of opinion."
Ibid.
When a State would directly impinge upon interests in free speech or
free press, this Court has on occasion held that opportunity for a fair
adversary hearing must precede the action, whether or not the speech
or press interest is clearly protected under substantive First Amendment
standards. Thus we have required fair notice and opportunity for an
adversary hearing before an injunction is issued against the holding of
rallies and public meetings. Carroll y. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175.
Similarly, we have indicated the necessity of procedural safeguards before
a State makes a large-scale seizure of a person's allegedly obscene books,
magazines and so forth. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205;
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717. See Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U. S. 51; Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58. See generally
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518.
In the respondent's case, however, the State has not directly impinged
upon interests in free speech or free press in any way comparable to a
seizure of books or an injunction against meetings. Whatever may be a
teacher's rights of free speech, the interest in holding a teaching job at a
state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest.
15 Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, is a related case.
There, the petitioner was a lawyer who had been refused admission to
practice before the Board of Tax Appeals. The Board had "published
rules for admission of persons entitled to practice before it, by which
attorneys at law admitted to courts of the United States and the States,
and the District of Columbia, as well as certified public accountants duly
qualified under the law of any State or the District, are made eligible.
. . . The rules further provided that the Board may in its discretion deny
admission to any applicant, or suspend or disbar any person after admission." Id., at 119. The Board denied admission to the petitioner under
its discretionary power, without a prior hearing and a statement of the
reasons for the denial. Although this Court disposed of the case on other
grounds, it stated, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, that the
existence of the Board's eligibility rules gave the petitioner an interest and
claim to practice before the Board to which procedural due process
requirements applied. It said that the Board's discretionary power
"must be construed to mean the exercise of a discretion to be exercised
after fair investigation, with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to
answer for the applicant as would constitute due process.'' Id., at 123.
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Just as the welfare recipients'"property"interest in welfare
payments was created and defined by statutory terms, so the
respondent's"property"interest in employment at the Wisconsin State University-Oshkoshwas created and defined by the
terms of his appointment. Those terms secured his interest in
employment up to June 30, 1969. But the important fact in
this case is that they specificallyprovided that the respondent's
employment was to terminate on June 30. They did not provide for contract renewal absent "sufficientcause."Indeed, they
made no provision for renewal whatsoever.
Thus the terms of the respondent's appointment secured
absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next year.
They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to
re-employment. Nor, significantly,was there any state statute
or University rule or policy that secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to it.16 In these
circumstances,the respondent surely had an abstract concern
in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities to give him a
hearing when they declined to renew his contract of
employment.
IV
Our analysis of the respondent'sconstitutional rights in this
case in no way indicates a view that an opportunity for a
hearing or a statement of reasons for nonretention would, or
would not, be appropriate or wise in public colleges and
universities.17For it is a written Constitution that we apply.
Our role is confined to interpretationof that Constitution.
We must conclude that the summary judgment for the respondent should not have been granted, since the respondent
has not shown that he was deprived of liberty or propertyprotected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedingsconsistent with this opinion.
// 15so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this
case.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting.
Respondent Roth, like Sindermannin the companion case,
had no tenure under Wisconsin law and, unlike Sindermann,
he had had only one year of teaching at Wisconsin State
- where from 1968-1969 he had been AsUniversity-Oshkosh
sistant Professor of Political Science and InternationalStudies.
Though Roth was rated by the faculty as an excellent teacher,
he had publicly criticized the administrationfor suspendingan
entire group of 94 Black students without determining individual guilt. He also criticized the University'sregime as being
authoritarianand autocratic. He used his classroom to discuss
what was being done about the Black episode; and one day,
instead of meeting his class, he went to the meeting of the
Board of Regents.
In this case, as in Sindermann, an action was started in a
Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 1 claiming in
16 To be sure, the respondent does suggest that most teachers hired on
a year-to-year basis by the Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh are, in
fact, rehired. But the District Court has not found that there is anything approaching a "common law" of re-employment, see Perry v.
Sindermann, post, at - , so strong as to require University officials to
give the respondent a statement of reasons and a hearing on their
decision not to rehire him.
17 See, e. g., Report of Committee A on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, "Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty
Appointments," 56 AAUP Bulletin 21 (Spring 1970).
1 Section 1983 reads as follows:
"Every person who, under color or any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
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part that the decisions of the school authorities not to rehire
was in retaliation for his expression of opinion. The District
Court, in partially granting Roth's motion for summary judgment, held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the University to give a hearing to teachers whose contracts were not
to be renewed and to give reasons for its action. 3 10 F. Supp.
972, 983. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 446 F. 2d 806.
Professor Will Herberg of Drew University in writing of
"academicfreedom"recently said:
... it is sometimes conceived as a basic constitutional right guaranteed
and protected under the First Amendment.
But, of course, this is not the case. Whereas a man's right to speak
out on this or that may be guaranteed and protected, he can have no
imaginable human or constitutional right to remain a member of a
university faculty. Clearly, the right to academic freedom is an
acquired one, yet an acquired right of such value to society that in the
minds of many it has verged upon the constitutional. [Washington
Evening Star, Jan. 23, 1972.]

There may not be a constitutional right to continued employment if private schools and colleges are involved. But
Prof. Herberg'sview is not correct when public schools move
against faculty members. For the First Amendment, applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment,
protects the individual against state action when it comes to
freedom of speech and of press and the related freedoms
guaranteedby the First Amendment; and the Fourteenth protects "liberty" and "property" as stated by the Court in
Sindermann.
No more direct assault on academic freedom can be
imagined than for the school authorities to be allowed to discharge a teacher because of his or her philosophical, political,
or ideological beliefs. The same may well be true of private
schools also, if through the device of financing or other
umbilical cords they become instrumentalities of the State.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated for constitutional theory in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 261-262 (concurringopinion) :
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings
made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born
of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit
of understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social
sciences, the concern of which is man and society. The problems that
are respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis, with
interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's good- if
understanding be an essential need of society - inquiries into these
problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection
upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must
abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the
interest of wise government and the people's well-being, except for
reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.

We repeatedthat warning in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.

When a violation of First Amendment rights is alleged, the
reasons for dismissal or for nonrenewal of an employment
contract must be examined to see if the reasons given are only
a cloak for activity or attitudes protected by the Constitution.
A statutory analogy is present under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. While discharges of employees for "cause" are permissible (Fibreboard Corp. v.
Labor Board, 379 U. S. 203, 217), discharge because of an
employee'sunion activities is banned by § 8(a) (3), 29 U. S. C.
§ 158 (c) (3). So the search is to ascertain whether the stated
ground was the real one or only a pretext. See /. P. Stevens
& Co. v. Labor Board, 380 F. 2d 292, 300.
In the case of teachers whose contracts are not renewed,
tenure is not the critical issue. In the Sweezy case, the teacher,
whose First Amendment rights we honored, had no tenure but
was only a guest lecturer. In the Keyishian case, one of the
petitioners(Keyishianhimself) had only a "one-year-termcontract" that was not renewed. 385 U. S., at 592. In Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, one of the petitioners was a teacher
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whose "contractfor the ensuing school year was not renewed"
(id., at 483) and two others who refused to comply were advised that it made "impossibletheir re-employmentas teachers
for the following school year." Id., at 484. The oath required
in Keyishian and the affidavit listing membershipsrequired in
Shelton were both, in our view, in violation of First Amendment rights. Those cases mean that conditioning renewal of a
teacher's contract upon surrenderof First Amendment rights
is beyond the power of a State.
There is sometimes a conflict between a claim for First
Amendmentprotectionand the need for orderly administration
of the school system, as we noted in Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U. S. 563, 569. That is one reason why summary judgments in this class of cases are seldom appropriate.
Another reason is that careful fact finding is often necessaryto
know whether the given reason for nonrenewal of a teacher's
contract is the real reason or a feigned one.
It is said that since teaching in a public school is a privilege,
the State can grant it or withhold it on conditions. We have,
however, rejectedthat thesis in numerous cases, e. g., Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374. See Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968). In Hannegan v. Esquire,
111 U. S. 146, 156, we said that Congress may not by withdrawal of mailing privileges place limitations on freedom of
speech which it could not do constitutionally if done directly.
We said in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339
U. S. 382, 402, that freedom of speech was abridgedwhen the
only restrainton its exercise was withdrawalof the privilege to
invoke the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board.
In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, we held that an applicant could not be denied the opportunityfor public employment because he had exercised his First Amendment rights.
And in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, we held that a denial
of a tax exemption unless one gave up his First Amendment
rights was an abridgementof FourteenthAmendmentrights.
As we held in Speiser v. Randall, supra, when a State proposes to deny a privilege to one who it alleges has engaged in
unprotected speech, Due Process requires that the State bear
the burdenof proving that the speech was not protected. "The
protection of the individual against arbitraryaction . . . [is]
the very essence of due process,"Slochower v. Board of Higher
Education, 350 U. S. 551, 559 (1956), but where the State is
allowed to act secretly behind closed doors and without any
notice to those who are affected by its actions, there is no
check against the possibility of such "arbitraryaction."
Moreover, where "important interests" of the citizen are
implicated (Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539) they are not to
be denied or taken away without Due Process. Id., at 539.
Bell v. Burson involved a driver's license. But also included
are disqualification for unemployment compensation (Sherbert v. Verner,374 U. S. 398), discharge from public employment (Slochower v. Board of Education, supra), denial of tax
exemption (Speiser v. Randall, supra), or withdrawal of welfare benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254. And see
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,400 U. S. 433. We should now
add that nonrenewalof a teacher'scontract, whether or not he
has tenure, is an entitlement of the same importance and
dignity.
Cafeteria Workersv. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, is not opposed.
It held that a cook employed in a cafeteria in a military installation was not entitled to a hearing prior to the withdrawalof
her access to the facility. Her employer was prepared to
employ her at another of its restaurants,the withdrawal was
not likely to injure her reputation, and her employment opportunitieselsewhere were not impaired. The Court held that
the very limited individual interest in this one job did not outweigh the Government's authority over an important federal
military establishment. Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is
tantamount in effect to a dismissal and the consequences may
be enormous. Nonrenewal can be a blemish that turns into a
permanent scar and effectively limits any chance the teacher
has of being rehired as a teacher at least in his State.
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If this nonrenewal implicated the First Amendment, then sented, and also with those portions of Parts II and III of the
Roth was deprived of constitutional rights (a) because his Court'sopinion that assert that a public employee is entitled to
employment was conditioned on a surrenderof First Amend- procedural due process whenever a State stigmatizes him by
ment rights and (b) because he received no notice and hearing denying employment, or injures his future employment prosof the adverse action contemplated against him. Without a pects severely, or whenever the State deprives him of a propstatement of the reasons for the discharge and an opportunity erty interest,I would go furtherthan the Court does in defining
to rebut those reasons- both of which were refused by peti- the terms of "liberty"and "property."
tioners- there is no means short of a lawsuit to safeguard the
The prior decisions of this Court, discussed at length in the
right not to be dischargedfor the exercise of First Amendment opinion of the Court, establish a principle that is as obvious as
it is compelling- i. e., federal and state governments and
guarantees.
The District Court held, 310 F. Supp. 972, 979-980:
governmentalagencies are restrainedby the Constitutionfrom
acting
arbitrarily with respect to employment opportunities
Substantive constitutional protection for a university professor
that they either offer or control. Hence, it is now firmly
against non-retention in violation of his First Amendment rights or
arbitrary non-retention is useless without procedural safeguards. I hold
establishedthat whether or not a privateemployer is free to act
that minimal procedural due process includes a statement of the
capriciously or unreasonably with respect to employment
reasons why the university intends not to retain the professor, notice
of a hearing at which he may respond to the stated reasons, and a
practices, at least absent statutory2 or contractual8 controls, a
hearing if the professor appears at the appointed time and place. At
government employer is different. The government may only
such a hearing the professor must have a reasonable opportunity to
submit evidence relevant to the stated reasons. The burden of going
act fairly and reasonably.
forward and the burden of proof rests with the professor. Only if he
This Court has long maintained that "the right to work for
makes a reasonable showing that the stated reasons are wholly inapa living in the common occupations of the community is of the
propriate as a basis for decision or that they are wholly without basis
in fact would the university administration become obliged to show
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it
that the stated reasons are not inappropriate or that they have a basis
in fact.
was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."
It was that procedure that the Court of Appeals approved. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915) (Hughes, J.). See
446 F. 2d 806, 809-810. The Court of Appeals also concluded also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). It has
that though the § 1983 action was pending in court, the court also established that the fact that an employee has no conshould stay its hand until the academic procedures had been tract guaranteeingwork for a specific future period does not
mean that as the result of action by the governmenthe may be
completed.2 As stated by the Court of Appeals in Sindermann:
"dischargedat any time for any reason or for no reason."
School-constituted review bodies are the most appropriate forums for
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S., at 38.
initially determining issues of this type, both for the convenience of the
In my view, every citizen who applies for a governmentjob
and
in
order
to
academic
to
in
bear
parties
bring
expertise
resolving
the nice issues of administrative discipline, teacher competence and
is entitled to it unless the government can establish some
school policy, which so frequently must be balanced in reaching a
reason for denying the employment. This is the "property"
proper determination. [430 F. 2d, at 944-945.]
right that I believe is protected by the Fourteenth AmendThat is a permissible course for District Courts to take, ment and that cannot be denied "withoutdue process of law."
though it does not relieve them of the final determination And it is also liberty- liberty to work- which is the "very
whethernonrenewalof the teacher'scontract was in retaliation essence of the personal freedom and opportunity"secured by
of the exercise of First Amendment rights.
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
This Court has often had occasion to note that the denial of
Appeals.
public employment is a serious blow to any citizen. See, e. g.,
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S.
123, 185 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 316-317 (1946). Thus, when an application for public employment is denied or the contract of a
governmentemployee is not renewed,the governmentmust say
why, for it is only when the reasons underlying government
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting.
action are known that citizens feel secure and protectedagainst
hired
was
as
an
assistant
of
Respondent
professor political arbitrary
governmentaction.
science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkoshfor the 1968Employmentis one of the greatest,if not the greatest, bene1969 academic year. During the course of that year he was
fits that governments offer in modern-day life. When sometold that he would not be rehired for the next academic term,
but he was never told why. In this case he asserts that the Due thing as valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United government may not reward some citizens and not others
States Constitutionentitled him to a statementof reasons and a without demonstratingthat its actions are fair and equitable.
And it is procedural due process that is our fundamental
hearing on the University'sdecision not to rehire him for another year.1 This claim was sustained by the District Court guarantee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary,capriwhich granted respondent summary judgment, 310 F. Supp. cious, and unreasonablegovernment action.
Mr. Justice Douglas has written that
972, and by the Court of Appeals which affirmedthe judgment
of the District Court. 446 F. 2d 806. This Court today reIt is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difverses the judgmentof the Court of Apeals and rejects responference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast
dent's claim. I dissent.
adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that
there will be equal justice under law. [Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee ComWhile I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion, setting
mittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 179.]
forth the proper frameworkfor considerationof the issue pre2 Such a procedure would not be contrary to the well-settled rule that
§ 1983 actions do not require exhaustion of other remedies. See, e. g.,
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971); Damico v. California,
389 U. S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668
(1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). One of the allegations
in the complaint was that respondent was denied any effective state
remedy and the District Court's staying its hand thus furthered than
thwarted the purposes of $ 1983.
1 Respondent has also alleged that the true reason for the decision not
to rehire him was to punish him for certain statements critical of the
University. As the Court points out, this issue is not before us at the
present time.

AUTUMN 1972

And Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said that "[t]he history of
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure." Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 414 (1945).
With respect to occupations controlled by the government one
lower court has said that "[t]he public has the right to expect
its officers ...
to make adjudications on the basis of merit.
The first step toward insuring that these expectations are
2 See, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971); 42
U. S. C. « 2000e.
3 Cf. Note, Procedural "Due Process" in Union Disciplinary Proceedings, 57 Yale L. J. 1302 (1948).
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realized is to requireadherenceto the standardsof due process;
absolute and uncontrolled discretion invites abuse." Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F. 2d 610 (CA5 1964).
We have often noted that procedural due process means
many different things in the numerous contexts in which it
applies. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 262 (1970);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971). Prior decisions have
held that an applicantfor admission to practice as an attorney
before the United States Board of Tax Appeals may not be
rejected without a statement of reasons and a chance for a
*
hearing on disputed issues of fact; that a tenured teacher
could not be summarilydismissedwithout notice of the reasons
and a hearing;Bthat an applicant for admission to a state bar
could not be denied the opportunity to practice law without
notice of the reasons for the rejection of his application and a
e
hearing; and even that a substitute teacher who had been
employed only two months could not be dismissed merely
because she refused to take a loyalty oath without an inquiry
into the specific facts of her case and a hearing on those in
dispute.7 I would follow these cases and hold that respondent
was denied due process when his contract was not renewed
and he was not informed of the reasons and given an opportunity to respond.
It may be argued that to provide procedural due process to
all public employees or prospectiveemployees would place an
intolerable burden on the machinery of government. Cf.
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra. The short answer to that argument
is that it is not burdensometo give reasons when reasons exist.
Whenever an application for employment is denied, an employee is discharged,or a decision not to rehire an employee is
made, there should be some reason for the decision. It can
scarcely be argued that government would be crippled by a
requirementthat the reason be communicated to the person
most directly affected by the government'saction.
Where there are numerous applicants for jobs, it is likely
that few will choose to demand reasons for not being hired.
But, if the demand for reasons is exceptionally great, summary
procedures can be devised that would provide fair and adequate information to all persons. As long as the government
has a good reason for its actions it need not fear disclosure.
It is only where the government acts improperly that procedural due process is truly burdensome. And that is precisely
when it is most necessary.
It might also be argued that to require a hearing and a
statementof reasons is to require a useless act, because a government bent on denying employment to one or more persons
will do so regardlessof the proceduralhurdles that are placed
in its path. Perhapsthis is so, but a requirementof procedural
regularity at least renders arbitrary action more difficult.
Moreover,proper procedureswill surely eliminate some of the
arbitrarinessthat results not from malice, but from innocent
error. "Experienceteaches . . . that the affordingof procedural
safeguards,which by their nature serve to illuminatethe underlying facts, in itself operates to prevent erroneous decisions on
the merits from occurring." Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 311 U. S. 341, 366 (1963). When the government
knows it may have to justify its decisions with sound reasons,
its conduct is likely to be more cautious, careful, and correct.
Professor Gellhorn put the argumentwell:
In my judgment, there is no basic division of interest between the
citizenry on the one hand and officialdom on the other. Both should
be interested equally in the quest for procedural safeguards. I echo
the late Justice Jackson in saying: "Let it not be overlooked that due
process of law is not for the sole benefit of the accused. It is the best
assurance for Government itself against those blunders which leave
lasting strains on a system of justice"- blunders which are likely to
occur when reasons need not be given and when the reasonableness and
indeed legality of judgments need not be subjected to any appraisal
than one's own. [6 J. Soc. Pub. Teachers of L. 70 (1961).]

Accordingly, I dissent.
4 Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926).
s Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. SSI (1956).
• Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96 (1963).
7 Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U. S. 207 (1972).
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Charles R. Perry et al., Petitioners,
v.
Robert P. Sindermann, etc.

Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court.
From 1959 to 1969 the respondent, Robert Sindermann,
was a teacher in the state college system of the State of Texas.
After teaching for two years at the University of Texas and
for four years at San Antonio Junior College, he became a
professor of Government and Social Science at Odessa Junior
College in 1965. He was employed at the college for four
successive years, under a series of one-year contracts. He was
successful enough to be appointed, for a time, the cochairman
of his department.
During the 1968-1969 academic year, however, controversy
arose between the respondent and the College administration.
The respondent was elected president of the Texas Junior
College Teachers Association. In this capacity, he left his
teaching duties on several occasions to testify before committees of the Texas Legislature, and he became involved in
public disagreementswith the policies of the college's Board
of Regents. In particular, he aligned himself with a group
advocating the elevation of the College to four-year statusa change opposed by the Regents. And, on one occasion, a
newspaper advertisement appeared over his name that was
highly critical of the Regents.
Finally, in May 1969, the respondent's one-year employment contract terminatedand the Board of Regents voted not
to offer him a new contract for the next academic year. The
Regents issued a press release setting forth allegations of the
respondent's insubordination.1 But they provided him no
official statement of the reasons for the nonrenewal of his
contract. And they allowed him no opportunityfor a hearing
to challenge the basis of the nonrenewal.
The respondent then brought this action in a federal district court. He alleged primarily that the Regents' decision
not to rehire him was based on his public criticism of the
policies of the college administrationand thus infringed his
right to freedom of speech. He also alleged that their failure
to provide him an opportunity for a hearing violated the
FourteenthAmendment'sguaranteeof proceduraldue process.
The petitioners- members of the Board of Regents and the
president of the College- denied that their decision was made
in retaliation for the respondent'spublic criticism and argued
that they had no obligation to provide a hearing.2 On the
basis of these bare pleadings and three brief affidavits filed
by the respondent,8the District Court granted summary judgment for the petitioners. It concluded that the respondent
had "no cause of action against the [petitioners] since his
contract of employment terminated May 31, 1969, and
Odessa Junior College has not adopted the tenure system."4
The Court of Appeals reversedthe judgmentof the District
Court. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F. 2d 939. First, it held
that, despite the respondent'slack of tenure, the nonrenewal
of his contract would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if
it in fact was based on his protected free speech. Since the
actual reason for the Regents' decision was "in total dispute"
in the pleadings, the court remanded the case for a full hearing on this contested issue of fact. Id., at 942-943. Second,
the Court of Appeals held that, despite the respondent'slack
of tenure, the failure to allow him an opportunityfor a hearing would violate the constitutional guarantee of procedural
due process if the respondent could show that he had an
"expectancy" of re-employment. It, therefore, ordered that
1 The press release stated, for example, that the
respondent had defied
his superiors by attending legislative committee meetings when college
officials had specifically refused to permit him to leave his classes for that
purpose.
2 The petitioners claimed, in their motion for summary judgment, that
the decision not to retain the respondent was really based on his insubordinate conduct. See n. 1, supra.
3 The petitioners for whom summary judgment was
granted, submitted
no affidavits whatever. The respondent's affidavits were very short and
the
of
his
essentially repeated
general allegations
complaint.
* The findings and conclusions
of the District Court- only several lines
long- are not officially reported.
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this issue of fact also be aired upon remand. Id., at 943-944.
We granted a writ of certiorari, 403 U.S. 917, and we have
considered this case along with Board of Regents v. Roth,
ante.

For this reason we hold that the grant of summary judgment against the respondent, without full exploration of this
issue, was improper.
II

I
The first question presented is whether the respondent's
lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment,taken
alone, defeats his claim that the nonrenewal of his contract
violated the First and FourteenthAmendments. We hold that
*
it does not.
For at least a quartercentury, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefitand even though the governmentmay deny him
the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons
upon which the government may not act. It may not deny a
benefitto a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests- especially, his interest in freedom of
speech. For if the governmentcould deny a benefitto a person
becauseof his constitutionallyprotectedspeech or associations,
his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited. This would allow the government to "produce a
result which [it] could not command directly." Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526. Such interference with constitutionalrights is impermissible.
We have applied this general principle to denials of tax exemptions, Speiser v. Randall, supra, unemployment benefits,
Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404-405, and welfare payments, Shapirov. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 n. 6; Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374. But, most often, we have
applied the principle to denials of public employment. United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100; Wieman v.
Updegraff,344 U. S. 183, 192; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S.
479, 485-486; Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495-496;
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 894; Cramp
v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278, 288; Baggett v.
Bullitt, 311 U. S. 360; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 17;
Keyishianv. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-606; Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54; United States v. Robel, 389 U. S.
258; Pickeringv. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568. We
have applied the principle regardless of the public employee's
contractual or other claim to a job. Compare Pickering v.
Board of Education,supra, with Shelton v. Tucker,supra.
Thus the respondent'slack of a contractualor tenure "right"
to re-employment for the 1969-1970 academic year is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this
Court has specifically held that the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be
predicatedon his exercise of First and FourteenthAmendment
rights. Sheldon v. Tucker, supra; Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, supra. We reaffirmthose holdings here.
In this case, of course, the respondent has yet to show that
the decision not to renew his contract was, in fact, made in
retaliation for his exercise of the constitutional right of free
speech. The District Court foreclosed any opportunityto make
this showing when it granted summary judgment. Hence, we
cannot now hold that the Board of Regents'action was invalid.
But we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is a
genuine dispute as to "whether the college refused to renew
the teaching contract on an impermissiblebasis- as a reprisal
for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights." 430 F.
2d, at 943. The respondent has alleged that his nonretention
was based on his testimony before legislative committees and
his other public statements critical of the Regents' policies.
And he has alleged that this public criticism was within the
First and Fourteenth Amendment'sprotection of freedom of
speech. Plainly, these allegations present a bona fide constitutional claim. For this Court has held that a teacher's public
criticism of his superiorson matters of public concern may be
constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for terminationof his employment. Pickering v.
Board of Education, supra.
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The respondent's lack of formal contractual or tenure
security in continued employment at Odessa Junior College,
though irrelevant to his free speech claim, is highly relevant
to his proceduraldue process claim. But it may not be entirely
dispositive.
We have held today in Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, that
the Constitution does not require opportunity for a hearing
before the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract,
unless he can show that the decision not to rehire him somehow deprived him of an interest in "liberty"or that he had a
"property"interest in continued employment, despite the lack
of tenure or a formal contract. In Roth the teacher had not
made a showing on either point to justify summary judgment
in his favor.
Similarly, the respondent here has yet to show that he has
been deprived of an interest that could invoke proceduraldue
process protection. As in Roth, the mere showing that he was
not rehired in one particularjob, without more, did not amount
to a showing of a loss of liberty/' Nor did it amount to a
showing of a loss of property.
But the respondent's allegations- which we must construe
most favorably to the respondentat this stage of the litigation
- do raise a genuine issue as to his interest in continued employment at Odessa Junior College. He alleged that this
interest, though not secured by a formal contractual tenure
provision, was secured by a no less binding understanding
fostered by the College administration. In particular, the
respondentalleged that the College had a de facto tenure program, and that he had tenure under that program. He claimed
that he and others legitimately relied upon an unusual provision that had been in the College official Faculty Guide for
many years:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has
permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and
as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and
his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work.

Moreover, the respondent claimed legitimate reliance upon
guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the
Texas College and University System that provided that a
person, like himself, who had been employed as a teacher in
the state college and universitysystem for seven years or more
has some form of job tenure.6 Thus the respondentoffered to
5 The Court of Appeals suggested that the respondent might have a due
process right to some kind of hearing simply if he asserts to college
officials that their decision was based on his constitutionally protected
conduct. 430 F. 2d, at 944. We have rejected this approach in Board of
Regents v. Roth, ante, at - n. 14.
6 The relevant portion of the guidelines, adopted as "Policy Paper 1"
by the Coordinating Board on October 16, 1967, reads:
"A. Tenure
"Tenure means assurance to an experienced faculty member that he
may expect to continue in his academic position unless adequate cause
for dismissal is demonstrated in a fair hearing, following established
procedures of due process.
"A specific system of faculty tenure undergirds the integrity of each
academic institution. In the Texas public colleges and universities, this
tenure system should have these components:
"(1) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or
a higher rank, the probationary period for a faculty member shall not
exceed seven years, including within this period appropriate full-time
service in all institutions of higher education. This is subject to the provision that when, after a term of probationary service of more than three
years in one or more institutions, a faculty member is employed by
another institution, it may be agreed in writing that his new appointment
is for a probationary period of not more than four years (even though
thereby the person's total probationary period in the academic profession
is extended beyond the normal maximum of seven years).
"(3) Adequate cause for dismissal for a faculty member with tenure
may be established by demonstrating professional incompetence, moral
turpitude, or gross neglect of professional responsibilities."
The respondent alleges that, because he has been employed as a "fulltime instructor" or professor within the Texas College and University
System for 10 years, he should have "tenure" under these provisions.
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prove that a teacher, with his long period of service, at this
particular State College had no less a "property"interest in
continued employment than a formally tenured teacher at
other colleges, and had no less a proceduraldue process right
to a statement of reasons and a hearing before college officials
upon their decision not to retain him.
We have made clear in Roth, ante, at - , that "property"
interests subject to procedural due process protection are not
limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, "property"
denotes a broad range of intereststhat are secured by "existing
rules or understandings."Id., at - . A person's interest in a
benefit is a "property"interest for due process purposes if
there are such rules or mutually explicit understandingsthat
supporthis claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may
invoke at a hearing. Ibid.
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly
is evidence of a formal understandingthat supports a teacher's
claim of entitlement to continued employment unless sufficient
"cause"is shown. Yet absence of such an explicit contractual
provision may not always foreclose the possibility that a
teacher has a "property"interest in re-employment. For example, the law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictionslong
has employed a process by which agreements, though not
formalized in writing, may be "implied." 3 Corbin on Contracts, §§ 56 1-672A. Explicit contractual provisions may be
supplemented by other agreements implied from "the
promisor'swords and conduct in the light of the surrounding
circumstances." Id., at § 562. And, "[t]he meaning of [the
promisor's] words and acts is found by relating them to the
usage of the past." Ibid.
A teacher, like the respondent,who has held his position for
a number of years, might be able to show from the circumstances of this service- and from other relevant facts- that he
has a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. Just as this
Court has found there to be a "common law of a particular
industryor of a particularplant" that may supplement a collective-bargainingagreement, Steelworkersv. Warrior & Gulf
Co., 363 U. S. 574, 579, so there may be an unwritten "common law" in a particularuniversitythat certain employees shall
have the equivalent of tenure. This is particularlylikely in a
college or university, like Odessa Junior College, that has no
explicit tenure system even for senior members of its faculty,
but that nonetheless may have created such a system in
practice. See Byse & Joughin, Tenure in American Higher
Education 17-28.7
In this case, the respondenthas alleged the existence of rules
and understandings,promulgatedand fostered by state officials,
that may justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employmentabsent "sufficientcause." We disagree with
the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that a mere subjective
"expectancy"is protected by procedural due process, but we
agree that the respondent must be given an opportunity to
prove the legitimacy of his claim of such entitlement in light
of "the policies and practices of the institution." 430 F. 2d, at
943. Proof of such a property interest would not, of course,
entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate
college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he
could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and
challenge their sufficiency.
Therefore, while we do not wholly agree with the opinion of
the Court of Appeals, its judgment remandingthis case to the
District Court is
Affirmed.
7 We do not now hold that the respondent has any such
legitimate
claim of entitlement to job tenure. For "[p] roperty interests ... are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as State law. . . ." Board of Regents v. Roth,
ante, at - . If it is the law of Texas that a teacher in the respondent's
position has no contractual or other claim to job tenure, the respondent's
claim would be defeated.
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Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this
case.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring.
I concur in the Court'sjudgmentsand opinions in Perry and
Roth, but there is one central point in both decisions that I
would like to underscore since it may have been obscured in
the comprehensivediscussion of the cases. That point is that
the relationship between a state institution and one of its
teachers is essentially a matter of state concern and state law.
The Court holds today only that a state-employedteacher who
has a right to re-employment under state law, arising from
either an express or implied contract, has, in turn, a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to some form of prior
administrative or academic hearing on the cause for nonrenewal of his contract. Thus whether a particularteacher in
a particular context has any right to such administrative
hearing hinges on a question of state law. The Court's opinion
makes this point very sharply:
Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law. . . ." Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, at pp.
12-13.

Because the availability of the Fourteenth Amendmentright
to a prior administrative hearing turns in each case on a
question of state law, the issue of abstentionwill arise in future
cases contesting whether a particular teacher is entitled to a
hearing prior to nonrenewal of his contract. If relevant state
contract law is unclear, a federal court should, in my view,
abstain from deciding whether he is constitutionally entitled
to a prior hearing, and the teacher should be left to resort to
state courts on the questions arising under the state law.
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas
joins, dissenting in No. 71-162 and dissenting in part in No.
70-36.
Although I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion in No.
70-36, I also agree with my Brother Marshall "that respondent[s] [were] denied due process when [their] contract[s]
[were] not renewed and [they were] not informed of the
reasons and given an opportunityto respond."Post, at - . Since
respondentswere entitled to summaryjudgmenton that issue, I
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No.
71-162, and, to the extent indicatedby my BrotherMarshall,
I would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No.
70-36.
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissentingin part.
Respondentwas a teacher in the state college system of the
State of Texas for a decade before the Board of Regents of
Odessa Junior College decided not to renew his contract. He
brought this suit in Federal District Court claiming that the
decision not to rehire him was retaliation for his public
criticism of the policies of the college administrationin violation of the First Amendment, and that because the decision
was made without giving him a statement of reasons and a
hearing, it denied him the due process of law guaranteedby the
FourteenthAmendment. The District Court grantedsummary
judgment for petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings. This Court
affirmsthe judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion holding that respondent has presented a bona fide First Amendment claim
that should be considered fully by the District Court. But, for
the reasons stated in my dissentingopinion in Board of Regents
v. Roth, No. 71-162, ante, at - , I would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to
enter summary judgment for respondent entitling him to a
statement of reasons why his contract was not renewed and a
hearingon disputed issues of fact.
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